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ABSTRACT
The rather large differences in yield spreads between fixed rate commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) and similarly rated investment grade corporate bonds lead one
to question the true risk facing the rated CMBS investor. In an effort to quantify the risks
inherent in these securities, a monte-carlo pricing model is developed that endogenizes
several factors affecting the underlying mortgages, and incorporates conditions related to
security design. The model and subsequent results are not only consistent with numerous
market pricing intricacies, but also lend original insight into the effects of diverse
marketplace parameters. As an example, the model's analysis of mortgage extension
presents a valid explanation for a portion of these excess spreads.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Yield spreads on fixed rate commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) exceed
similarly rated investment grade corporate bonds at all rating levels. At non-investment
grade levels for example, the spread differences have exceeded three hundred basis
points. Although spreads have tightened somewhat over the past eighteen months,
substantial return differences still exist across all rating levels. These differences
immediately lead one to question the true risk facing the rated CMBS investor.
Under the assumptions of an efficient market, any discrepancy between equally rated
securities that are equivalent in all other respects would be eliminated through arbitrage
competition. Although it is plausible that investor and rating agency unfamiliarity with
these securities may account for a portion of these differences, the theory of a competitive
securities market suggests a deeper explanation.
In assessing the true risk exposure of a CMBS, numerous uncertainties must be properly
addressed. In particular, the inherent risks in the underlying collateral are compounded by
complex issues surrounding borrower behavior. In addition, due to the youthfulness and
unique design of this type of security, the response nuances of commercial mortgage
partitioning are not well understood. Although, the security derives its value from a pool
of whole loans, varying levels of claim priority facing the distinct investment classes
(tranches) are likely to impart effects that differ from those of a whole loan viewed
separately.
The focus of this thesis is to determine the direct valuation effects of these inherent risk
factors. By developing a CMBS pricing model that endogenizes several factors affecting
the underlying collateral, the effects of a changing environment are examined under
varying security designs.
The result is not only a model that is consistent with numerous market pricing intricacies,
but one that also lends original insight into the effects of diverse marketplace parameters.
As an example, the model's analysis of the untested area of mortgage extension presents
a valid explanation for a portion of the excess spreads currently viewed in the market.
In order to provide insight into the model's framework, it is helpful to further detail the
historical aspects related to the development of CMBS. The dramatic growth in this
market stems from the unique combination of factors present in the marketplace in the
early 1990's. With the understanding that CMBS are derivative securities, the proper
place to begin this review lies within the area of commercial whole loan investment.
1.1 Investment Background
1.1.1 Commercial Whole Loans
Historically, commercial mortgages had offered greater yields than treasury securities and
investment grade corporate bonds. Institutions were attracted to these yields and allocated
increasing amounts of capital to this investment class. In fact, outstanding commercial
mortgage debt grew steadily from an early 1982 amount of $425 Billion, to a mid 1991
peak of $1.08 Trillion. This dramatic increase is evident in Figure 1-1 which shows year
end Total Mortgage Debt Outstanding through the years of 1985-1989.
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Figure 1-1
Commercial Mortgage Debt
The combination of i) preferential tax treatment for real estate, ii) deregulation of the
financial services industry and, iii) a prosperous economy, fostered the 1980's boom in
real estate. This resulted in a situation in which loans were being underwritten on the
assumption of continually increasing prices (Quigg, 1993). As a result, this market grew
to be larger than the municipal bond market and only 20% less in size than the corporate
bond market.
As we are all well aware, the real estate market has undergone profound change since the
turn of the decade. The tax reform act of 1986 removed almost all of the attractive tax
incentives for owning real estate. At the same time, the overabundant availability of debt
capital resulted in overbuilding, and produced a drastic oversupply in the market. The
combined action of this increase in supply coupled with the lowered demand decreased
prices, and brought the commercial real estate market into collapse. To make matters
worse, prior enactment of lenient regulatory action was reversed and tighter restrictions
were implemented.
Once the downturn in the market took place, this overleveraged exposure to real estate
risk resulted in miserable loan portfolio performance. Lenders were faced with
tremendous losses. According to one study by Coopers & Lybrand, approximately 23%
of the total commercial mortgages underwritten during the period between 1984 and 1990
were restructured or foreclosed (Childs, Ott & Riddiough, 1994). They estimate that this
represents over $300 Billion of commercial loan investment. Several banks and insurance
company loan portfolios experienced delinquency rates of thirty percent (30%). Certain
mid-80's cohorts experienced ex post holding period returns that differed from contract
rates by a reduction exceeding five percent (5%) (Ciochetti & Riddiough, 1994).
As a result of this experience, many lenders withdrew from the market. In addition,
numerous others were forced out. The major reason for many Savings & Loan failures
were these overwhelming losses brought on by commercial loan investment. Between the
first quarter of 1988 and the year end of 1992, thrift holdings of commercial and multi-
family mortgages were reduced by 55% and 35% respectively. Figure 1-2 clearly
illustrates the withdrawal of mortgage capital by traditional lending sources, an important
factor fostering the growth of the CMBS market.
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Figure 1-2
Withdrawal of Traditional Lending Sources
Further fallout resulting from these blatant losses has come from increased regulatory
pressure. Governing bodies have compelled institutions to write down or dispose of non-
performing mortgages. The beginning of 1994 ushered in new, more stringent, risk-based
capital requirements for life insurance companies. As a result, additional capital reserve
provisions are placed upon the lender as commercial loans are now included in the
riskiest investment category. The following section shall outline how these regulatory
changes have become another key factor in the growth of the CMBS market.
1.1.2 Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities
The interrelated and synergistic effects of, i) the distressed real estate market, ii) the poor
performance of commercial loans, iii) the retrenchment of lenders, and iv) the subsequent
regulatory reaction, led to several new marketplace requirements. First of all, a capital
starved real estate market required re-supply. Secondly, "credit enhancement" of
portfolios was needed in order to meet the new risk based capital rules, and finally, quick
disposal of troubled assets was now imperative.
The requirement of supply side capital resulted from the drastically curtailed lending
activity. As previously outlined, the retreat from the market of traditional lending sources
was severe. Between the first quarter of 1990 and the second quarter of 1993, the share of
major institution's multifamily and other commercial loans dropped from 56 % to 46 %,
and from 90 % to 83 % respectively. Although approximately one half of this $130
billion decline may be accounted for by an overall decline in the market, the balance none
the less created an enormous credit vacuum.
Furthermore, regulatory changes resulting from the aforementioned risk based capital
rules forced institutions to seek alternative investments. Table 1-A outlines the new
requirements and illustrates the incentive provided to hold investment grade securities as
opposed to whole loans.
Table 1-A
Risk Based Capital Requirements
* This percentage is multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.5 to 3.0, reflecting the individual company's
two-year past delinquency and foreclosure experience compared to the two-year industry average.
While the most significant capital factor requirement for investment grade securities is
only 1 %, with AAA-A being only 0.3 %, commercial mortgages on the other hand
require anywhere from 1.5 %, to a high of 9 %. The more highly rated tranches of CMBS
fall under the securities guidelines and therefore enhance the credit of an institutional
mortgage portfolio. This drastically reduces the capital reserve allocations required to
hold such investments and provides a strong outlet for CMBS.
In addition, the pressure to dispose of non-performing and problem assets resulted in a
huge over supply of mortgages on the sale block. More than $10 billion of book value
was transferred by thirty two private institutions as of November 1993. It is believed that
there was another $1.7 billion still in the pipeline at that time. Perhaps more importantly,
RTC liquidations during this same timeframe totaled $13.4 billion. Such massive
conveyances required a new, more efficient market.
The intermediary nature of the capital markets is well set up to handle these newly
created market needs. Firstly, they provide an efficient market for capital re-supply.
Secondly, they are a source for qualified credit enhancement for institutions familiar with
the underlying collateral. Finally, securitized transactions may easily accommodate the
swift transfer of assets that was required.
As a result, the CMBS market developed rapidly. The RTC provided the initial impetus
for this growth with its willingness to take huge losses in exchange for rapid disposal of
its acquired assets. This large transaction volume helped to develop the critical mass of
infrastructure, and allowed investors to become more familiar with this new security
without the perception of great risk.
Many have joined the ranks of the RTC in taking advantage of this vehicle, and total
CMBS issuance has grown rapidly over the last several years. Since 1990 there have been
more than $65 billion of CMBS securities supplied to the market. This dramatic growth is
well reflected by Figure 1-3 which shows total CMBS issuance segregated into RTC and
non-RTC components.
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Figure 1-3
RTC and Non-RTC CMBS Issuance
It is important to note that although the RTC was heavily responsible for the early rise of
this market, RTC issuance has steadily declined from its peak in 1992. The RTC supplied
the necessary initial stimulus and has left behind a stronger market. Although, RTC
issuance will soon phase out entirely, the market has its own momentum and continued
growth prospects are excellent.
While some estimates expect as much as 25 % -40 % of the $290 billion multifamily
mortgage market and 5 %-10 % of the $700 billion comprising other commercial
mortgages to become securitized, only 2.7 % of non-residential commercial mortgages
and 10.3 % of multifamily mortgages were securitized by the end of the second quarter of
1993. Whereas Figure 1-4 shows the relatively small proportion of securitized
commercial mortgages as of the first quarter of 1994, recently, some buyers of CMBS
have estimated that the market will grow to encompass 20 %-30 % of the entire trillion
dollar market.
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Commercial Mortgage Securitization
The market obviously has tremendous expansion potential. With $160 billion of existing
commercial mortgages maturing each year, this market could reach $18- $30 billion of
annual issuance on turnover alone. Traditional lenders will continue to be encumbered by
the regulatory burden as the new capital requirements have the support of bank
depositors, insurance policy holders and the financial markets. Mortgagees may then
resort more to conduit arrangements, a turnover process that will foster continued
lending. Overall, the potential for close to $200 billion of outstanding CMBS may even
be possible by the end of the decade (Quigg, 1993).
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1.2 Pricing Considerations
The interplay of pricing between the private and capital markets will undoubtedly play a
role in the growth of the CMBS market. It is therefore important to understand the
similarities and differences between securities and their underlying whole loans in terms
of risk.
Uncertainty of cash flows produced by the underlying mortgages is a major factor
affecting the pricing of CMBS. Three important, yet unstable decision factors
contributing to whole loan uncertainty are: i) default, ii) extension, and iii) prepayment.
Due to the fact that many commercial mortgage contracts contain prepayment lockout or
yield maintenance clauses, only the first two are considered in this study.
Commercial lending is typically done on a non-recourse basis. That is, the only source for
recovery of principal is the property itself. In addition, unlike the single family
residential market, there is no insurance available to cover default losses in the
commercial mortgage market. Although such insurance has been attempted, the problem
of adverse selection has been a major factor in its demise. As a result, the exposure
resulting from borrower default is the major concern to the commercial mortgage backed
securities investor.
The mortgagor has the option to relinquish his title to the property and walk away from
the debt. The investor is then left with an asset which may or may not be as valuable as
the note. Certainly, in most cases, the underlying collateral is not as valuable at this
point, otherwise the borrower would not have foregone the equity.
The second uncertain risk of concern results from the decision to extend the term of a
loan beyond its original maturity. Upon encountering a situation in which the borrower is
either unable or unwilling to retire the note, the investor may grant additional time for
repayment of principal. This will certainly affect the timing of cash flows to the investor
by delaying full repayment of the note. Even in a flat term structure, the potential
negative yield impact may become significant as the result of increased exposure to
default.
Typically, extended loans tend to be in financial distress. For example, the decision to
extend is not likely to be enacted for the case in which it is certain that recovery from
property price will cover the outstanding debt. As a result, extension usually involves the
continued financing of a problem loan. A problem loan has an increased probability of
default, and if property value continues to deteriorate, recovered principal could further
diminish.
Under the unique design structures typical of commercial mortgage backed securities,
there exist various levels of insulation against this overall exposure. Higher priority
tranches are afforded "credit protection" by subordinate tranches, as these lower level
tranches are first to absorb losses. Partitioning and prioritization of whole loan cash flows
alters the return dynamics and each investment tranche behaves differently than the loan
as a whole.
Altered by this type of structure, changes affecting the underlying collateral may not
necessarily affect each security tranche in the same manner. For instance, Childs, Ott, and
Riddiough (1995) indicated that the known benefits from loan diversification extended
directly to the upper tranches, but that same diversification is actually detrimental to a
first loss tranche. Consequently, the specifics of security design in terms of priority and
tranche size will play an important role in determining required yield spreads. In order to
gain further insight into the inherent pricing uncertainty, the following chapter outlines
some of the research relevant to these pricing considerations.
2. Relevant Literature Review
2.1 General Profile
The research most relevant to this topic tends to originate from two key areas of debt
related pricing inquiry: i) commercial whole loan pricing, and ii) commercial mortgage-
backed security pricing. Due to the newness of the CMBS market, there has been little
formal study covering this topic directly. Valuation of the derivative security of CMBS is
certainly dependent upon proper pricing of its underlying asset composition of whole
loans however, and direct CMBS pricing insight may therefore be gained from whole
loan research.
The analysis techniques utilized for much of the recent pricing investigation generally fall
into two categories: i) rational option pricing, and ii) monte-carlo simulation. The former
quantifies the options embedded in mortgage contracts (put-default, call-prepayment) and
utilizes sharp decision boundaries for borrower behavior. The latter on the other hand,
incorporates uncertainty by placing probabilities upon borrower decisions and then
generates numerous sample paths to realize value. Both models will be more thoroughly
outlined in the next chapter.
Please note that this chapter is not intended as an exhaustive outline of research in these
areas. Rather than review the entire body of influential work, several studies are
highlighted instead, with the intention of giving the reader sufficient background to
understand the evolution of more recent research surrounding contingent claims
approaches, and their application for pricing CMBS. This approach should assist the
reader to grasp the logic behind the methodology utilized in this paper.
The summary embodied by Table 2-A is a useful guideline for review of the significant
factors of each outlined piece of work. The table summarizes each paper's: i) area of
research focus, ii) overall methodology as applicable to that of this paper, and iii)
significant findings. The table is organized by progression through each general area of
inquiry.
Table 2-A
LITERATURE REVIEW
Sd f.U ~ ~ M
. ... . . -
Table 2-A (cond.)
2.2 Whole Loan Research
We have seen, that both the size and investment impact of the whole loan market is
substantial. Due to the unavailability of data however, there has been little formal research in
this area. A large proportion of this market is in the private hands of banks and insurance
companies, and they are under no obligation to disclose dissagregate contractual and/or
performance information. Many companies view such information as proprietary and will not
disperse data considered to supply a competitive advantage. None the less, this area of
research still supplies the greatest amount of applicable insight into the valuation of CMBS.
Traditional default assessment in this area has focused on cross-sectional mortgage
evaluation. That is, defaults were measured as a percentage of a loan portfolio at any given
point in time. A more appropriate and telling measure however, would track loans throughout
their lifetime. Snyderman (1991) utilized such a "longitudinal" approach to default study and
refuted the conventional wisdom surrounding the borrower's decision. The study's default
projection of 15.4% tripled the previous belief of frequencies centered in the 5% range.
This important study also indicated that frequencies varied with loan cohort. The fact that
certain years of origination produced significantly different levels of default frequency
indicated that there appeared to be more advantageous periods in which to make loans.
Snyderman's (1994) second study confirmed that default rates did in fact have a negative
relationship with the previous five years cumulative change in property value. We would then
expect endogenization of property value to be an important consideration for modeling whole
loans and the resultant CMBS.
In order to properly price the cost of default, it is important to understand the actual loss that
results once a foreclosure occurs. The Ciochetti & Riddiough (1994) analysis of post
foreclosure performance indicated loss recoveries in the range of 75% -80%, and these results
provide a valid benchmark for modeling borrower behavior in a CMBS structure.
Recent modeling approaches have borrowed from the contingent claims approach of
representing the liability as an option on the total value of the assets. This approach is popular
for corporate bond pricing, and an option model was tested for commercial mortgage debt by
Titman & Torous (1989). A significant portion of observed default premia was accounted for
by their model, which suggests option pricing may provide accurate estimates of commercial
mortgage rates.
The model used by Titman & Torous (1989) assumed "ruthless default" scenarios. That is,
default is considered to occur as soon as the mortgage value exceeds building value. By
providing for the existence of borrower transaction costs of default, Vandell (1992) on the
other hand illustrated that such costs may result in underexercise of the default decision. This
improved design provides for greater explanatory power by more accurately reflecting
borrower behavior, a factor that should also contribute to more precise modeling and
valuation of CMBS.
Riddiough & Thompson (1993) represented the importance of mortgage contract terms and
conditions when determining whole loan pricing. Their approach determined that significant
effects result from the underwriting requirements of loan to value (LTV) and amortization,
factors that may differ for each loan in a CMBS pool. Furthermore, Riddiough & Thompson
(1993) illustrated that property characteristics and mortgage contract design are more
important than interest rate environment for assessing pricing impact, an important
consideration in the development of the model of this thesis.
In order to incorporate the numerous state variables required for such an assessment,
Riddiough & Thompson (1993) implemented a monte-carlo pricing model for their study.
This illustrates an important benefit of the monte-carlo technique. As opposed to rational
option models, monte-carlo modeling more easily incorporates complex cash flow patterns
and numerous state variables. Modeling CMBS tranche structuring and consideration of a
greater number of endogenous variables is therefore more straightforward under this
approach.
A more important benefit of the approach stems from the fact that the previously
aforementioned and important borrower transaction costs (Vandell (1992)), are not accurately
observable to the lender. As a consequence, utilizing probabilities to simulate more non-
discrete, "fuzzy", default boundaries may be more appropriate for modeling borrower default
decisions.
One last key point regarding the Riddiough & Thompson (1993) study relates to their clever
consideration of a significant criticism of monte-carlo models. Typically, these models fail to
incorporate the value of the embedded option, and it is therefore argued that pricing is
inaccurate. Recognizing this concern, the authors set a default probability function that varied
with time to maturity. Although this function was somewhat ad hoc, their method of
addressing the criticism was none the less a valid attempt at improving the model.
In summary, the body of this literature makes progressive strides toward the understanding of
the borrower's default decision, and its resultant effect upon whole loan pricing. This thesis
will attempt to directly relate these methodologies regarding mortgagor behavior to the pooled
loan framework of commercial mortgage backed securities. In the same manner as Riddiough
& Thompson (1993), the thesis model will also utilize a monte-carlo approach that
incorporates option value. Changes in property characteristics and mortgage contract design
will then be tested for their effect upon the distributed cash flows of various CMBS tranches.
2.3 Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Research
Unfortunately, there has been extremely little formal research conducted directly on CMBS
pricing. The few studies in this area utilize the same general framework as previously outlined
and do provide some insight into the understanding of these complex securities.
As learned from studies valuing whole loans, underlying real estate risk is a significant factor
in assessing loan value, and it is therefore important to endogenize property price. Corcoran &
Kao (1994) demonstrated that this risk extends directly to commercial mortgage backed
securities. By linking delinquencies from American Council on Life Insurance data with
returns outlined by the Russell NCREIF index, they developed a framework for assessing the
credit risk of CMBS. Their results indicate that the effect of a modest rise in property prices
has substantial impact on CMBS. In addition, as amortization has similar effects upon LTV,
they determined that it too has subsequent consequences on the overall security.
By factoring in the uncertainty of property price, Childs, Ott, & Riddiough (1995) quantified
required yield spreads for several typical CMBS tranche structures. Utilizing a combined
approach of rational contingent claims decision making, and monte-carlo analysis, their model
determined that tranche structure is an important pricing factor. In addition, their results
outlined diversification effects unique to each tranche. Of particular interest was the indication
that diversification may actually increase the required yield spreads for a first loss junior
tranche.
Understanding the importance of endogenized property price upon CMBS valuation, the
analysis undertaken by this thesis will attempt to confirm these structure and diversification
effects. Furthermore, by building upon prior modeling of decision behavior, the thesis will
also strive to assess the effects of loan extension. The following chapter details the approach
utilized for this evaluation.
3. The Pricing Model
3.1 Introduction
Accurate assessment of CMBS investment requires a pricing model that properly incorporates
the uncertainties inherent in the underlying mortgage collateral. In the context of unsure
property values, mortgage value is affected by the irregular behavior surrounding the
borrower's default decision. Further uncertainty results from the servicer's decision regarding
borrower extension requests. Therefore, in order to obtain a meaningful value for any security
comprised of mortgage assets it is imperative to properly address these pricing considerations.
As outlined by the previous chapter, the modeling techniques utilized by recent researchers
have generally fallen into the categories of rational option pricing, and monte-carlo
simulation. Although each technique is a valid attempt at explaining borrower behavior,
monte-carlo simulation has several benefits for modeling complex borrower behavior, and is
the approach used for this study. In an effort to outline these benefits, this section will further
compare both techniques.
Rational option based models consider the implicit value of the borrower's default put option.
Due to the uncertainty in property prices, and the irreversibility of the default decision, there
is value for the borrower in maintaining this right to default. Although exercising the option
limits the downside exposure for the borrower, keeping the option alive retains possible
upside benefits. In other words, market volatility may return the borrower to a position of
positive equity, provided the option has not already been exercised. Rather than basing this
decision on a simple loan to value comparison then, a borrower will instead compare property
value against a mortgage value that also accounts for the value of the put option.
Unfortunately, the reverse time path approach of a rational model requires ex-ante
determination of borrower default transaction costs, and it is difficult to accurately ascertain
such costs at the time of loan origination. These costs may be significant, and they vary
widely with diversity in contract arrangements, state and local foreclosure regulations, and
individual borrower behavior. In addition, indirect costs, such as those associated with
securing future credit, further exacerbate the problem by being essentially unobservable to the
lender.
Another criticism of the rational option model is that it assumes the borrower has no short
term cash flow problems. In other words, the approach postulates that every debtor has the
ability to finance a cash deficiency in order to keep his default put option alive. Periodic
payments must be made to continue the option rights, and not all borrower's will necessarily
hold this ability. Loss of a major tenant for instance may very well affect the timing of
default.
In a rational model, all borrowers are considered to make the same judicious decision based
upon encounter of set criteria. The monte-carlo method on the other hand, accounts for a
greater level of uncertainty in borrower behavior by utilizing less distinct boundaries of
decision criteria. Here, the effects of unobservable borrower transaction costs are endogenized
by placing probabilities on the decisions of the debtor, and the result is a more realistic
reflection of the range of complex behavior exhibited in the marketplace.
In addition, the monte-carlo method is more flexible. A probability based, forward path
analysis makes it easier to consider variations in the borrower's behavior, and multiple state
variables are more easily incorporated into the analysis. Perhaps even more importantly
however, the forward path approach is a much better fit for distributing cash flows that are
dependent upon previous allocations, a factor critical to modeling CMBS.
As opposed to the rational option model, a major criticism of the monte-carlo approach is that
it does not consider the value of the borrower's default put option. The approach taken by this
thesis addresses this problem by utilizing a default probability function developed by
Riddiough & Thompson (1993), and this function is detailed in the following section.
3.2 Whole Loan Model
The CMBS monte-carlo pricing model developed for this research is rooted by a model that
prices whole loans. As outlined in Chapter 1, the most important risk affecting commercial
mortgages is that of default. The emphasis of the whole loan model is therefore centered on
the examination the borrower's default decision. Due to the fact that most commercial
mortgages contain lockout or yield maintenance clauses, prepayment risk will not be
considered.
The model prices a commercial mortgage with a fixed rate of interest for a fixed term, and
requires fixed payments at discrete time intervals. A balloon payment will vary with the rate
of amortization, and the loan is assumed to be non-recourse to the borrower. In the event of
default, foreclosure is assumed to occur immediately with the lender having fixed transaction
costs of foreclosure. The model allows for variation of all loan terms, and transaction costs,
and although only immediate foreclosure is considered, any time lag may be easily
incorporated into the model.
Figure 3-1 illustrates the flow of the model. Basically, the monte-carlo analysis simulates
numerous possible cash flow outcomes for the life of the loan. Property price is updated at the
start of each period, and default is then considered based upon equity level. If a default does
not occur, the lender receives the scheduled mortgage payment. The default decision is then
viewed for the following period based upon a new updated property price, and the process
continues until maturity or default. In the alternative, if a default does occur, the lender
obtains the property value, less the lender's foreclosure costs, and the loan is terminated.
Extension risk is also priced into the loan via decision simulation. If the loan has reached the
end of its contract term, an extension is considered. If no extension occurs, the loan is
immediately paid in full. On the other hand, if extension does occur, no payoff is made and
the loan continues under the same terms and conditions as before for an additional two year
term. Default continues to be considered at each period during the extended term, and if the
loan survives the two year extension without a default, no further extension is considered, and
the loan is assumed to pay off in full.
Finally, the loan value is calculated as the present value of these varying payment streams.
Monte-Carlo analysis simulates numerous, discreet scenarios of such possible varying cash
flow streams and averages the results to obtain a specific mortgage value. The greater the
number of iterations, the more the mortgage value approaches its true limit.
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Figure 3-1
Logic Flowchart- Whole Loan Model
3.2.1 The Decision Frequency Functions
3.2.1.1 Default Frequency
The default decisions are modeled by placing probabilities upon the likelihood of borrower
default. A borrower's default decision is based upon his economic interest in the property, and
the probabilities therefore vary continuously according to the borrower's equity level for the
current period. The greater the equity, the lower the probability of default.
As previously outlined, part of the borrower's economic interest is embedded in the default
option. In order to account for the inherent value of the option, the default frequency function
varies with time remaining in the contract term of the mortgage. This is the same approach
utilized by Riddiough & Thompson (1993), and the probabilities used in this analysis are
identical to theirs. Although more empirical work is needed in this area, this approach
produced default frequency results consistent with those observed in the marketplace.
Riddiough & Thompson (1993) observed that default is less likely early in the loan term, as
borrowers are less willing to lose the default option that may be of benefit latter in the loan
term. The value of this option becomes less valuable as the term draws near, and as a result,
defaults occur at less severe levels of negative equity as the end of the loan term approaches.
The point probabilities used for this analysis follow this logic and are listed in Table 3-A. The
term Et is a normalized measure of net equity level. That is: Property Price at time t, divided
by the Mortgage Value at time t , (Pt/Mt ). The default probability values at the
commencement of the loan term are represented by f(EO,O), while f(ET ,T) is the probability
that is assumed at the end of the loan term. It is important to note the inverse relationship
between the probability of default and net equity level, as well as the reduced default
probabilities at loan commencement.
Table 3-A
Default Probabilities
0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.0
0 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0
To properly account for the borrower's option value, the following quadratic weighting
system was used to interpolate probabilities at intermediate loan periods:
f(Et ,t) = [f(EO ,0) * (1- (t/T)2)] + [f(ET ,T) * (t/T)2] Eq 3.1
where: t = intermediate period
and, T = maturity period
This weighting system produces a probability function that initially moves away from the
lower bound (f(EO,0)) at a gradual rate and then rapidly approaches the upper bound (f(ET,T))
as the end of the term draws near. Figure 3-2 graphically illustrates this relationship by
comparing probabilities at: i) origination (EO), ii) halfway through the loan term (EO. 5), iii)
eighty percent through the loan timeframe (EO. 8 ), and iv) loan maturity (ET).
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Default Probability Function
To keep the inverse relationship smooth across the range of net equity, a continuous default
function was implemented by using linear interpolation to determine the probabilities
associated with intermediate levels of net equity. Note, that even under a negative equity
situation, default is not certain, as is the case for ruthless default models (see Titman &
Torous, 1989). In addition, there is a possibility of default even at positive levels of equity, a
possibility consistent with the findings of Ciochetti & Riddiough (1994).
Finally, the renewed default option value associated with the extension term of an extended
loan is accounted for by adjusting the default probability function (Equation 3.1). This
adjustment resets the maturity (T) to: T + 24, while the current period (t) is not altered. In this
manner, the probabilities for default decrease immediately following the grant of an
extension. Note that this decrease would not be as severe as those that would occur under a
new origination, and that the default probabilities will again increase as the new maturity
draws nearer. Overall, these are likely to be reasonable assumptions regarding borrower
behavior.
3.2.1.2 Extension Frequency
Due to the lack of any empirical evidence regarding extension frequencies, an ad hoc
extension probability function was postulated based upon principles similar to those
governing the default probability function. First of all, the possibility of extension is assumed
to hold an inverse relationship with net equity level. In addition, extension may occur even at
positive levels of net equity and, it is certain to occur at net equity levels low enough to
warrant certain default at maturity. Table 3-B displays the increasing probabilities that
accompany borrower net equity decreases.
As a result of the assumption that extension may only occur at the end of the loan term, this
probability function was not assumed to vary with time remaining to maturity. This is
consistent with the fact that this option does not belong to the borrower, but rather ultimately
relies with the lender, and no option value should be implied.
Due to the ad hoc nature of the extension probabilities, two separate sets of point probability
estimates were utilized to assess the effects of extension. The alternate scenarios outlined by
the independent estimates are intended to provide a reasonable range for the likelihood of
extension. The extension probability is not a function of the combination of these two arrays,
as is the case for the default frequency function. Instead, each set of estimates is
independently incorporated and separately tested in the analysis. Both arrays are outlined in
Table 3-B, where it can be seen that the second set of estimates provides a more conservative
conjecture of extension probability.
Table 3-B
Extension Probabilities
0.1 0.5
0 0.25
0.75 1.0
0.5 1.0
In order to incorporate a continuous probability function, the probabilities associated with
intermediate values of net equity were determined through simple linear interpolation.
3.2.2 The Property Price State Variable
The state variable used by the model to capture the effects of mortgage value is Property
Price. The borrower uses property price, plus default transaction costs, as a reference for
comparison against outstanding mortgage value. As the previous sections have illustrated,
borrower decisions, and therefore pricing, are contingent upon this dynamic variable as a
result of its effect upon current equity position.
Although commercial property prices also rely upon stochastic interest rates, term structure
volatility is not endogenized in this model. Childs, Ott, & Riddiough (1994) demonstrated that
a constant interest rate assumption produces relatively little effect when pricing call protected
mortgages. Upon comparing the two approaches, they discovered small differences between
required risk premiums over ranges of both property value volatility and term to maturity.
Their conclusion emphasizes that accurate representation of the current term structure is more
important for pricing non-callable mortgages.
In assessing the stochastic movements of property price, the model uses a log-normal
diffusion process. Constant mean and variance parameters have been assumed, and the change
in Property Price is given by the following equation:
dP = (a-b)Pdt + apPdZ, Eq. 3.2
where: a = instantaneous total expected return on property
b = continuous rate of property payout
a,= instantaneous standard deviation of property prices
Z= standardized Wiener process
Following standard contingent claim requirements, it can be assumed that investors price
derivative securities independent of risk preferences. The following risk adjusted price process
may then be used:
dP = (rf - b)Pdt + apPdZp Eq. 3.3
where: rf = riskless spot rate of interest
This then allows for discounting at the risk free rate of interest. To implement the process, an
annual payout rate of eight and one half percent (8.5%) was utilized, while time increments
were always monthly. The volatility and risk free rate parameters were varied and these
assumptions are presented in more detail by Chapter 4.
3.2.3 Input/Output Specifications
Any set of fixed loan contract terms may be analyzed. This includes any desired LTV, interest
rate, amortization, loan term, and number of payments per year. The state variable parameters
of risk free rate, payout rate, and property price volatility are also separately input and may
take on the full range of typical values.
The monte-carlo technique of generating numerous pricing solution paths gives us
approximations for exact solutions. The number of state variable path iterations is only limited
by computer run-time, where run-time increases linearly with the length of the loan term. Five
thousand (5000) iterations generally produces reasonable convergence to the "true" mortgage
value while requiring only short run time.
3.3 CMBS Model
The CMBS model is an extension of the whole loan model. The model derives cash flows
from an embedded whole loan model in the same manner that commercial mortgage backed
securities derive their cash flows from their underlying mortgages. Basically, numerous loans
are individually simulated every period. Rather than price each loan separately however, the
periodic cash flows from this pool of loans are instead agglomerated and then distributed on a
priority basis to the various tranches that make up the security.
Just as in the whole loan model, property price for each loan included in the pool is updated at
the beginning of each period. The default decision is then separately considered for each loan,
and individual loan cash flow is dependent upon the outcome of that decision. This process
continues for each loan, for each period until the end of the loan term. Once maturity is
reached for a particular loan, that loan is then considered for extension, and the resultant
individual loan cash flow is once again set by the outcome of that decision.
Each period, total interest and total principal received from all loans in the pool are distributed
to the various tranches according to the particular priorities associated with each tranche. Each
tranche's resultant cash flow is appropriately discounted, and the process continues until all
loans have reached their original maturity or, if applicable, the end of their extended term.
Tranche value is simply calculated as the sum of the discounted cash flows. The entire process
is performed over and over to obtain convergence to a true tranche value. Finally, this tranche
value is set as the initial cash outlay for a stream of non-risky cash flows (scheduled, no-
default payments) and the yield to maturity is calculated through an iterative process.
3.3.1 Security Structure
A tranche structure typical of many commercial mortgage backed securities is utilized. This
structure prioritizes distribution in a top down manner. That is, the higher the tranche, the
higher its priority for return of principal.
Each period every tranche receives periodic interest earned on its then outstanding tranche
balance. In the case in which tranche contract rates of interest are set below the underlying
loan contract rates, excess interest available from the loans is distributed to an "Interest Only"
tranche.
All principal from the entire pool is then distributed to the highest priority tranche. Once the
uppermost tranche has received all of its outstanding balance, the periodic principal payments
are granted to the next highest priority tranche until it too has been retired. Principal continues
to be distributed by tranche priority.
A tranche may also be retired as a result of allocation of default losses. Any loss resulting
from the shortfall between loss recovery (property value less lender foreclosure costs) and the
outstanding loan balance, is allocated in a bottom up manner. That is, the lowest priority
tranche still alive bears this loss. If a tranche has lost its entire balance due to default, the next
higher priority tranche then bears these losses. Once again, the periodic distribution process
continues based on the new balances of each tranche.
3.3.2 Input/Output Specifications
Each loan may have its own individual set of contract terms, and the number of loans allowed
in the pool is limited only by computer memory. In addition, loans may have property prices
that are either fully correlated, or completely non-correlated with other loans in the pool.
Although this results in a very large number of possible designs, computer run time increases
with the number of loans included in the pool.
The model also allows for any number of tranches, and any tranche contract rates or pool
proportions (percentage of the entire pool balance allocated to a particular tranche) may be
individually assigned. To keep consistent with the whole loan discounting structure, this study
assumes all loans had contract rates equal to the risk free rate and that all tranches also shared
this rate. Under the same risk neutral assumption outlined in the state variable section of this
chapter (see Eq. 3.3), discounting again occurred at the risk free rate of interest.
Monte-carlo runs of five thousand iterations were run and the following output was produced
for all of the various scenarios:
1) Spread- The difference between the risk free rate and the risky yield to maturity
2) % Default- Average Default Frequency as a percentage of the total number of
loans
3) % Extension Frequency- Average Extension Frequency as a percentage of the
total number of loans
4) % Average Loss Recovery- Average Loss Recovery as a percentage of the
weighted average loan amount
The next chapter outlines and analyzes the overall results.
4. Results
4.1 Test Parameter Specifications
Variation of the state variable parameters will alter the periodic property prices and ultimately
affect pricing of the underlying mortgages. A change in property price alters the borrower's
net equity level and influences the default decision. This then has a direct impact upon
pricing, as a change in losses affects cash flows. In addition to this impact, differing loan
contract terms will also modify the equity position and directly affect pricing in the same
manner.
To determine the relative effects of each of these variables, comparative static sensitivity
analysis is performed through systematic variance of each parameter. The reference for the
comparative analysis is a "base case" scenario from which parameters were varied one at a
time. Table 4-A details these alternate values alongside the comparative base case scenario.
Table 4-A
Parameter Variation
Loen to- Vd .1-111
A................
Te. t... M M... d .
8.00% annual 10.00% annual
17.50% annual 22.50% annual
70% 80%
Interest Only 25 year
3 years 7 years
The base case Property Price parameters are taken from market observations, and those
estimated in previous literature, while the variant Contract Terms attempt to replicate several
originations typical in the market.
In order to determine the effects of pool size (measured by the number of loans comprising
the pool), a minimum of four scenarios were typically run. The four sizes included securities
with 1, 2, 5, and 10 loans. Utilization of this format provides insight into diversification
effects, due to the fact that the model provides for individual property price paths for each
loan ("Independent Draw"). That is, in some scenarios, each loan is considered to be totally
uncorrelated with the other loans in the pool. In such a case, a greater number of loans in the
pool produces greater diversification of the security.
In order to extract additional understanding of the effects from diversification, the model
allows reversal of the zero correlation assumption, and instead can provide identical property
price paths for each loan ("Dependent Draw"). For cases with identical state variable
parameters, the loans are 100% correlated. Pricing differences here lie only in the variance of
individual borrower decisions.
To distinguish the effects of tranche structure, results from several alternate distributions were
viewed. The structures utilized are outlined by Table 4-B.
Table 4-B
Tranche Structures
Lastly, in order to better understand the specific consequences of exposure to extension risk,
the model incorporates a choice for inclusion of such risk. In other words, the model also
prices the tranches under a scenario in which extension is not allowed. The dual ability to
price securities either by endogenizing this risk, or by omitting it, grants the capacity to single
out the significance of such exposure.
The number of monte-carlo iterations was held constant at five thousand (5000) for all cases.
This number of simulations should produce results sufficient enough to perform meaningful
analysis, and the level of variance surrounding the results appears to be reasonably small at
this level of iteration.
4.2 Discussion of Numerical Results
4.2.1 Base Case
Spreads for the base case scenario are presented in Table 4-C. All three tranche structures are
presented in an order that is ascending by size of the junior tranche, and therefore descending
by mezzanine tranche size. The number of loans in the pool increases moving left to right.
Due to the increased risks associated with lower priority tranches, one would expect spreads
to increase as tranche priority decreases, and the model's output supports this conclusion for
all structures, in all pool sizes. The senior tranche holds steady across structure because it
always contains the same level of subordinate credit enhancement. That is, the combined size
of the junior and mezzanine tranches is always thirty percent (3 0%) of the security in this
analysis.
Table 4-C
Base Case Spread Requirements
DRAW- INDEPENDENT With Extension Risk
LTV Term (yrs) Rate Amortization Volatility
70% 3 8.00% 1.0. 17.5%
SPREAD (basis points)
On the other hand, the level of protection afforded to the mezzanine tranche by the junior
tranche varies. As increased junior tranche size affords greater loss protection for the
mezzanine piece, one would expect decreasing mezzanine spreads for increasing junior
tranche size across all pool sizes. Again, the model supports this relationship.
There is also an inverse relationship between junior tranche size, and junior tranche spread
requirements. This generally holds true for all pool sizes, and again this result is intuitive. The
larger the tranche size of this first loss piece, the more likely a portion of its original balance
will remain after absorption of default losses.
All of these structure relationships are evident in Figure 4-1, which compares individual
tranche spreads within and across all tranche structures. It will become apparent that these
relationships hold across all tested scenarios.
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Base Case Spread Requirements
It is also very apparent that pool size has a drastic effect upon all tranches no matter what the
structure. You will note a general decrease in the required spreads for the two most senior
tranches as you move from left to right across Table 4-C. This is an indication that significant
benefits are available to these two tranches as a result of diversification, because
diversification benefits result from reduced cash flow volatility, and a greater number of non-
correlated loans will produce more stable cash flow.
Countering this intuition however, are the results from the junior tranche. Figure 4-1 clearly
illustrates that all structures produce junior piece spreads that increase with pool size (front to
back along Figure 4-1). This indicates that diversification is detrimental to this tranche, and
lends further support to results obtained by Childs, Ott & Riddiough (1995).
The reasoning behind this outcome has to do with the fact that this tranche is the first to
receive losses. As such, it is consistently out of the money with respect to return of principal,
and the cost of increased downside cash flow volatility is therefor small. Benefits from
volatility however are reflected by the greater chance of low losses, a factor that reduces
required yields.
Further examination of the results in Table 4-C lends supplementary credence to this
explanation. Note that the effects of this diversification effect decrease as the tranche size
increases. The increases in required spreads from a pool of one loan to a pool of ten loans is
much greater for a five percent junior piece (Structure 1) than for a junior piece comprised of
twenty percent (Structure 3). In addition, note that the smaller the size of the junior tranches,
the less the accrual of diversification benefits to the mezzanine tranche.
The results from Tranche Structure 3 indicate a limit to the detrimental effects of
diversification for the junior tranche. A larger pool run (50 loans) for each tranche shows that
there does in fact appear to be a limit across all structure levels, and these results are outlined
in Table 4-D.
Table 4-D
Base Case Spreads Up to 50 Loans
DRAW- DEPENDENT
LTV Term (yrs)
70% 3
With Extension Risk
Rate
8.00%
Amortization
I.0.
Volatility
17.5%
SPREAD (basis points)
1i Z U U U
186 211 109 50 3
235 473 1036 1443 1871
18 2 0 0 0
169 155 27 7 0
221 445 708 815 810
18 1 0 0 0
143 51 3 0 0
216 314 379 377 376
Note that the larger the size of the first loss tranche, the fewer loans it takes to reach the
diversification limit. This makes sense as larger size means that a greater proportion of the
tranche would behave as a mezzanine piece. That is, proportionally less and less of the tranche
would be in a first loss position, and it would trend away from the reverse behavior of a first
loss piece.
In a similar manner, the size of the junior tranche also affects the diversification limit of the
mezzanine tranche. As the level of credit protection provided to a mezzanine tranche is
increased, less and less of the mezzanine piece would behave as a first loss tranche. As a
result, the larger the junior tranche, the fewer number of loans required for the mezzanine
piece to reach the maximum benefit from diversification.
4.2.2 Correlated Output
Further evidence in support of this interesting diversification behavior comes from a series of
results collected under the assumption of fully correlated loans (Dependent Draw). Table 4-E
outlines the base case scenario spreads that result under this framework.
Table 4-E
Base Case- Fully Correlated Loans
DEN
LTV
70%
DEPEENT
Tenm (yrs)
3
Wt h Ext ensi on R sk
Rate Amortization Volatility
8.00% 1. 0 17.5%
SPFEAD ( basi s poi nt s)
A comparison of these results with the non-correlated base case generally indicates greater
spreads for the higher priority tranches. The required spreads need to increase in order to
compensate for the reduced diversification benefits. In addition, these increases are
particularly more prevalent in the larger pool situations, where one would expect
diversification differences to be more pronounced.
The decrease in spreads as pool size increases illustrates a diversification benefit due to the
addition of variant borrower behavior. One loan imparts no diversification benefits as a result
of variant borrower behavior, for there is only one borrower for a single loan pool. The benefit
is obtained in the cases with more than one borrower, but the overall benefit is reduced due to
the fact that we are not gaining from diversified property prices.
Again, we encounter a detrimental effect from diversification for the junior tranche. As
expected, the effects are not as severe due to the non-correlated aspect of the loans. The effect
of junior tranche size on this behavior has the same trend in this scenario. The smaller the first
loss piece, the greater the negative effects.
4.2.3 Alteration of State Variable Parameters
As previously discussed, one would expect altered property prices, and therefore altered
tranche pricing, as a result of changes effected to state variable parameters. Increased property
value volatility should increase the likelihood of default (Riddiough & Thompson, 1993) and
therefor increase required tranche spreads. On the other hand, a term structure change of an
increased risk free rate should lower spreads due to the fact that default risk is being
discounted at a higher rate of interest.
4.2.3.1 Property Price Volatility
Table 4-F
Property Volatility Comparison- Spreads
DEPENDENT
Term (yrs)
3
Rate
8.00%
Amortization
1.0.
With Extension Risk
Volatility
Base (17.5%)
vs. 22.5%
SPREAD (basis points)
186 383
235 441
211
473
449
837
109
1036
328
1961
50
1443
U
220
2949
18 59 2 10 0 0 0 0
169 365 155 387 27 145 7 73
221 438 445 830 708 1465 815 1857
18 63 1 8 0 0 0 0
143 335 51 203 3 8 0 3
216 418 314 701 379 819 377 872
Table 4-F outlines the results for a high property value volatility (22.5%), and the data match
our expectations. A comparison to the base case indicates that the spreads are higher for all
tranche structures at all pool levels. This result is graphically illustrated by Figure 4-1 where a
side by side volatility comparison is made across all tranche structures and all pool sizes.
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Property Volatility Comparison- Spreads
The reasoning behind this increase is indeed a result of increased default loss. Table 4-G
compares default frequencies and default severity (loss recovery) of the base case against
those obtained utilizing a higher rate of property value volatility. In all cases, the increase in
rate of default and the decrease in loss recovery of the high volatility scenarios are significant.
The greater movement in property prices that results from increased volatility produces a
greater likelihood of the loan encountering a situation of negative equity. As default
probability increases with reduced equity, there is an accompanying overall increase in default
frequency. This greater movement in property price also increases the likelihood of lower
property values at foreclosure and more severe levels of default tend to occur.
Table 4-G
Property Volatility Comparison- Default & Extension Incidence
DRAW IND3BEEOET
LTV Term (yr)
70% 3
/o Loas txeded
% Loas Defalted
Recomery(%Avf Loan)
% Loans Extended
% Loans Deauted
Rec'ery(%of Avg Loan)
% Loas Extended
% Loans Defauted
Recovery(% of Avg Lcan)
Wth Edenson
Rate
8.00%
1U.0%
8.28%
69.97%
10.38%
8.24%
71.09/6
10.74%
8.460/
71.25%
Amortization
1.0Q
14.0 f
14.64%
63.49%
1368%
14.52 /
63.94%
15.20%
14.44%
6273%
1UM0%
8.65%
69.64%
11.190/a
8.66%
70.27%
10.76%
7.87%
70.51%
14.b /c
14.01%
63.15%
15.000/c
14.65%
63.340/c
15.060/c
14.680/c
64.060/c
10.% M/
8.46 /
70.31%
10.73%
8.36%
70.54%
10.74%
8.50%
70.46%
In addition, it is important to note that the increase in property
positive impact upon the rate of extension. This of course is to
probability is also a function of borrower equity, and the same
volatility also has a strong
be expected, as extension
reasoning as that underlying
increased default then applies. The effects of extension will be more thoroughly discussed in a
latter section.
As with the base case, spreads increase with decreasing tranche priority, and the senior piece
remains steady across structure. In addition, we continue to find that mezzanine spreads
decrease with increased junior tranche size, and the required spreads of the junior position are
negatively affected by an increase in its own size.
Once again we encounter the same diversification benefits for the top priority tranches, as
well as the same negative impact from diversification to the junior piece. The smaller this
kladti'
Base (17.5/9
vs 225%1o
14.W0c
14.69/c
63.81 0/c
14.61 0/c
14.240/c
64.060/c
15.040/c
14.340/c
63.870/c
10.7% /
8.35%
70.06%
10.95%
8.56%
69.69%
10.900/
8.52%
70.570/
15.UYc
14.590/c
63.81%
15.000/c
14.860/c
63.15%
14.855%
14.58%
63.31%
piece the larger this detrimental impact. The same indications of overall limits for both
diversification effects also apply. The larger the junior tranche, the fewer loans required to
near this limit.
4.2.3.2 Term Structure
Table 4-H outlines a comparison of results from differing interest rates. As expected, spreads
decrease with an increase in the riskfree rate. This is an important factor, for it indicates that
the model is able to accurately factor changes in the current term structure. As previously
mentioned, under certain assumptions, this consideration is more important than a stochastic
rate assumption (Childs, Ott, & Riddiough, 1995), and therefore has strong ramifications for
our pricing considerations.
Table 4-H
Interest Rate Comparison- Spreads
DRAW- INDEPENDENT
LTV Term (yrs)
70% 3
Rate
Base (8.00%)
vs. 10.00%
Amortization
1.0.
With Extension Risk
Volatility
0.175
SPREAD (basis points)
186 130
235 167
Z
211
473
U
126
306
U
109
1036
66
676
U
50
1443
21
901
18 15 2 1 0 0 0 0
169 127 155 97 27 15 7 1
221 169 445 295 708 514 815 513
18 11 1 0 0 0 0 0
143 98 51 32 3 1 0 0
216 150 314 226 379 252 377 246
Review of these results will uncover the identical overall trends and behavior as outlined
under the base case. That is, spreads increase with priority, junior piece tranche size directly
affects spreads of the mezzanine and junior tranches, and diversification is a benefit to the two
top tranches but a detriment to the bottom tranche. Once again, the smaller the size of the
junior piece, the greater the effects of this detriment.
4.2.4 Alteration of Loan Contract Terms
The loan to value ratio and rate of amortization both play a direct role in the calculation of net
equity. As such, we would expect a negative effect on pricing from a larger loan to value ratio
(as equity is decreased), and a positive pricing effect from loan amortization (as equity is
increased).
Our intuition is supported by prior research. Riddiough & Thompson (1993) demonstrated
these effects for whole loan pricing, and Childs, Ott, & Riddiough (1995) illustrated the
benefits of partial amortization on CMBS tranche pricing. In addition, Riddiough &
Thompson (1993) find a negative impact on whole loan pricing as a result of a longer term to
maturity. One would therefore expect the same loan term impact on the required spreads of a
commercial backed security.
4.2.4.1 Loan to Value Ratio
Table 4-I displays the pricing results obtained from a security comprised of underlying loans
originated at an eighty percent (80%) loan to value ratio. The expected results are apparent in
the significantly higher spreads overall as compared to the base case. At smaller pool sizes,
the negative effects even reach the senior tranche.
Only at the upper pool levels is the senior tranche unaffected. This is probably due to the
dominance of the same diversification effects previously outlined. In fact, review of Table 4-I
puts forth the identical effects and trends from diversification as those encountered under the
base case scenario. Furthermore, it can be seen that the overall interactions between spreads
and tranche priority, as well as those between spreads and tranche size are the same as those
found at the base case level.
Table 4-I
Loan to Value Comparison- Spreads
DRAW- INDEPENDENT
LTV Term (yrs)
Base (70%) 3
vs. 80%
Rate
8.00%
Amortization
1.0.
With Extension Risk
Volatility
0.175
SPREAD (basis points)
19 46
186 411
235 497
2
211
473
430
982
0
109
1036
0
289
2161
0
50
1443
0
191
3032
18 44 2 5 0 0 0 0
169 364 155 333 27 122 7 46
221 479 445 927 708 1543 815 1788
18 45 1 6 0 0 0 0
143 316 51 162 3 24 0 1
216 455 314 708 379 840 377 832
The much greater overall level of spreads is also explained through a significant increase in
default. Table 4-J compares the severity and frequency of default for these two scenarios.
Although there appears to be only slight increases in default severity (reduced loss recovery),
overall there are enormous differences in the number of defaults. These losses obviously
translate directly to greater required spreads.
Table 4-J
Loan to Value Comparison- Default & Extension Incidence
DRAW INDEPENDENT
LTV Term (yr Pate
Bas(74 3 8.00%
Ys.80%1
% Loans Exended
% Loans Deauted
Recvery(%dfAvg Loan)
% Loans Extended
% Loans Defalted
Reovery(%of Avg Loan)
% Loans Extended
% Loans Defauted
Recovery(%of Ava Loan)
10.680/
8.28/6
69.97%
10.380/
8.24%
71.09/6
10.74%
8.460/
71.25%
18.480/c
17.16 /c
69.52 /C
17.62%
16.40/c
69.69/C
18.720/c
16.32 /C
69.120/c
Wth Fxtension
Amortization
1.0.
10.82%
8.65%
69.64%
11.190/
8.66%
70.27%
10.76%
7.87%
70.51%
17.930/c
16.770/c
69.940/c
18.010/c
16.92 /C
69.98%
18.630/c
16.420/c
69.050/c
Volatility
0.175
10.89%
8.46%
70.31%
10.73%
8.36%
70.54%
10.74%
8.50%
70.46%
1.54/c
16.940/c
69.730/c
18.38%
16.740/c
69.640/c
18.67%
16.76%
68.92%
10.770/
8.35%
70.060/
10.95%
8.560/
69.69/
10.900/
8.52%
70.570/
18.23%
16.58%
69.570/c
18.17/c
16.82/c
69.74%
18.42/c
16.660/c
69.560/c
A security comprised of 80% LTV loans also manifests an increased level of extension. The
increased level of default results from a greater probability of reduced equity. This reduced
equity similarly affects extension, as it too is a function of net equity.
4.2.4.2 Amortization
The model produced the expected results for a security comprised of partially amortizing
loans. Base case comparison as outlined in Table 4-K indicates that even partial amortization
of the underlying loans is beneficial for the security. As expected, the already well protected
senior tranche receives less benefit from the periodic pay down than does the exposed first
loss junior tranche.
Table 4-K
Amortization Comparison- Spreads
INDEPENDENT
Term (yrs)
3
Rate
8.00%
Amortization
Base (1.0.)
vs. 25 yr.
With Extension Risk
Volatility
17.5%
SPREAD (basis points)
186 146
235 182
211
473
154
376
109
1036
U
72
788
50
1443
U
26
1085
18 14 2 1 0 0 0 0
169 133 155 110 27 14 7 2
221 178 445 351 708 517 815 572
18 12 1 1 0 0 0 0
143 110 51 32 3 0 0 0
216 181 314 247 379 284 377 279
Once again, the primary trends surrounding tranche size and priority are evident in this case.
In addition, the effects from diversification of the security follow the same guidelines as those
discovered for the base case.
As expected, the default rates for securities comprised of partially amortizing loans are lower
than those corresponding to the non-amortizing base case. Apparently, even a small amount of
periodic principle produces sufficient enough impact upon net equity levels to make a
difference in borrower decisions. Further inspection of Table 4-L suggests that the defaults
that do occur under this scenario are actually a little more severe than their base case
counterparts. This is due to the fact that in this study, loss recovery is calculated as a
percentage of original loan value rather than as a percentage of outstanding loan balance.
DRAW-
LTV
70%
Table 4-L
Amortization Comparison- Default & Extension Incidence
DRAW- INDEPENDENT
LTV Term (yr
70% 3
/o Loans tx-enaea
% Loans Defaulted
Recovery(% of Avg Loan)
% Loans Extended
% Loans Defaulted
Recovery(% of Avg Loan)
% Loans Extended
% Loans Defaulted
Recovery(% of Avg Loan)
1 U.007o
8.28%
69.97%
10.38%
8.24%
71.09%
10.74%
8.46%
71.25%
Rate
8.00%
0. /0710
6.68%
67.27%
9.48%
6.70%
67.16%
9.04%
7.34%
69.37%
Amortization
Base (1.0.)
vs. 25 yr.
~1 U.o47o
8.65%
69.64%
11.19%
8.66%
70.27%
10.76%
7.87%
70.51%
U.4 / 70
6.93%
67.46%
9.10%
6.90%
67.38%
9.35%
6.52%
67.66%
With Extension Risk
Volatility
17.5%
I U.00o
8.46%
70.31%
10.73%
8.36%
70.54%
10.74%
8.50%
70.46%
%1. 170
6.62%
67.71%
9.02%
6.42%
67.99%
8.99%
6.73%
67.35%
I-u. I/ 70
8.35%
70.06%
10.95%
8.56%
69.69%
10.90%
8.52%
70.57%
Extension frequency is also reduced as a result of amortization. This result is intuitively
consistent considering this function's reliance upon net equity value.
4.2.4.3 Term to Maturity
Overall, significantly greater spreads are required for a security comprised of loans that have
longer terms to maturity. Examination of Table 4-M compares the three year term loan backed
securities of the base case against those backed by loans due in seven years. This result is
simply explained by longer exposure to the possibilities of default loss. Property price is
stochastic, and the greater the period of time this variable is under scrutiny, the greater the
likelihood for development of a problem encounter with negative equity.
0./070
6.65%
67.78%
9.10%
6.72%
68.15%
9.08%
6.86%
68.41%
,--- , 
Table 4-M
Term to Maturity Comparison- Spreads
DRAW- INDEPENDENT
LTV
70%
Term (Vrs)
Base (3)
vs. 7
With Extension Risk
Rate
8.00%
Amortization
1.0.
Volatility
17.5%
SPREAD (basis points)
19 41
186 269
235 314
2
211
473
333
624
U
109
1036
262
1332
50
1443
228
1871
18 43 2 10 0 1 0 0
169 279 155 290 27 165 7 104
221 338 445 620 708 1048 815 1293
18 41 1 9 0 1 0 0
143 241 51 158 3 47 0 12
216 310 314 503 379 614 377 655
The next table (4-N) clearly shows the drastic increase in default frequency and severity that
explains the greater spread requirements for this type of security. Basically, problem loans
have more opportunity to become even worse, and the result is more losses producing greater
spread requirements.
Table 4-N
Term to Maturity Comparison- Default & Extension Incidence
DRAW- INDEPENDENT
LTV Term (Vrs)
70% Base (3)
vs. 7
Rate Amortization
8.00% l.0.
With Extension Risk
Volatility
17.5%
70oLoans r-x0enae0
% Loans Defaulted
Recovery(% of Avg Loan)
% Loans Extended
% Loans Defaulted
Recve(0/% of Av Loan)
% Loans Extended
% Loans Defaulted
Recoverv(% of Ava Loan)
I U.007o
8.28%
69.97%
10.38%
8.24%
71.09%
10.74%
8.46%
71.25%
~ 4.407fo
25.34%
64.14%
12.42%
26.60%
63.81%
12.34%
26.92%
64.38%
~ U.0470O
8.65%
69.64%
11.19%
8.66%
70.27%
10.76%
7.87%
70.51%
~I .4070
26.04%
64.30%
12.72%
26.54%
63.53%
12.09%
26.12%
64.20%
'lU.007o
8.46%
70.31%
10.73%
8.36%
70.54%
10.74%
8.50%
70.46%
~I.4'-70
26.24%
65.12%
12.30%
26.19%
64.12%
11.98%
25.96%
64.40%
'lU.//70
8.35%
70.06%
10.95%
8.56%
69.69%
10.90%
8.52%
70.57%
1 4.V (70
26.44%
64.51%
12.33%
26.17%
64.09%
12.13%
26.20%
64.12%
The pervasive trends involving the relationships between priority, tranche size and required
spreads generally hold true for this overall series of scenarios, although there is slightly more
variation in the lower sized pools than previously encountered. In addition, the unique
diversification effects affecting the various tranches are also encountered for securities of this
maturity class.
Finally, extension frequency again increases for this contract term change. The results have
illustrated that the greater length of time for property drift to occur, the greater the occurrence
of negative equity. This, once again, not only has an effect upon default, but also upon the
incidence of extension.
4.2.5 Extension Risk
Overall, the various sets of results produced from the diverse parameter shocks have indicated
an increased incidence of extension. It is important to understand the ramifications of this in
terms of how it affects risk. This section will illustrate the significance of this exposure and
aid our understanding of this un-tested area.
Our first intuition regarding extension revolves around the timing of cash flows. First,
recognize that this model does not endogenize alternate term structure shapes, therefore issues
surrounding duration are not considered. However, the model will address the issue of how
extension risk affects default losses. The opportunity for far greater yield impact is embedded
in this effect, and it should therefore become a concern of higher priority.
No intuition may be gained from previous literature directly focused in this area. We are able
however to incorporate our understanding of other factors affecting mortgage and tranche
value and apply them to extension risk. The most direct application is fostered in the
preceding section.
Longer times to maturity have produced significantly larger spreads due to their consequent
effect upon default loss. As discussed, by allowing for longer drift time, property prices have
more opportunity to encounter situations of negative equity. One would then similarly expect
to encounter some upward effect upon required spreads as a result of an extension decision.
After all, an extended loan is simply a longer term to maturity loan. This upward trend is not
predicted to be large however, for only some proportion of those loans should extend.
A factor of greater concern is that extended loans are typically in the midst of financial
hardship. The increased spread requirements of increased LTV loans has already been
demonstrated, and extended loans tend to be at extremely high levels of LTV. In most cases,
the collateral is not sufficient enough to cover the outstanding balance. Basically then, the
situation is one of financing very troubled loans, and the result is a pool left with problem
mortgages.
4.2.5.1 Extension Array #1
The differences between base case results with and without the factor of extension risk are put
forth in Table 4-0. Although the direction of these differences are consistent with our
expectations, the magnitude of the spread differences was surprising. These results indicate a
very significant effect from extension exposure. Except for the zero spreads of the senior
tranche at high pool levels, this exposure is reflected by all tranches, across all structures and
pool sizes.
Table 4-0
Extension Comparison- Spreads
DRAW- INDEPENDENT
Term (yrs)
3
Rate
8.00%
WITH & WITHOUT Extension Risk #1
Amortization Volatility
1.0. 17.5%
SPREAD (basis points)
186 94
235 124
Z
211
473
U
92
273
U
109
1036
U
33
523
50
1443
U
8
671
18 6 2 0 0 0 0 0
169 78 155 56 27 4 7 0
221 117 445 225 708 327 815 356
18 6 1 0 0 0 0 0
143 63 51 10 3 0 0 0
216 112 314 151 379 170 377 174
LTV
70%
The senior tranche is affected the most on a percentage wise basis, but this is due to the fact
that this well insulated tranche has very small spreads to begin with. The junior tranche is
affected slightly more as pool size increases, although this may simply be the result of less
noise with increasing pool size.
An explanation of the sizable overall differences is again well explained by default analysis.
Table 4-P depicts the frequency and severity of default under both scenarios, and the results
clarify the underlying issues. Across the board, drastic increases in default frequency are
compounded by significant decreases in loss recovery.
Table 4-P
Extension Comparison- Default Incidence
DRAW- INDEPENDENT W4ITH & WITHOUT Extension Risk #1
LTV Term (yrs) Rate Amortization Volatility
70% 3 8.00% L.0. 17.5%
% Loans Extended 10.68% 0.00% 10.82% 0.00% 10.89% 0.00% 10.77% 0.00%
% Loans Defaulted 8.28% 4.56% 8.65% 4.97% 8.46% 4.47% 8.35% 4.45%
Recovery(% of Avg Loan) 69.97% 75.97% 69.64% 76.20% 70.31% 76.32% 70.06% 76.22%
% Loans Extended 10.38% 0.00% 11.19% 0.00% 10.73% 0.00% 10.95% 0.00%
% Loans Defaulted 8.24% 4.36% 8.66% 4.58% 8.36% 4.56% 8.56% 4.61%
IRecovery(% of Avg Loan) 71.09% 76.27% 70.27% 76.42% 70.54% 77.05% 69.69% 76.03%
% Loans Extended 10.74% 0.00% 10.76% 0.00% 10.74% 0.00% 10.90% 0.00%
% Loans Defaulted 8.46% 4.50% 7.87% 4.31% 8.50% 4.46% 8.52% 4.58%
Recovery(% of Avg Loan) 71.25% 76.07% 70.51% 76.58% 70.46% 75.72% 70.57% 75.84%
This table illustrates that for all cases, this rate of increased extension nearly doubles the rate
of default. Furthermore, loss recovery is decreased by approximately eight percent. In other
words, the overall outlook for a troubled loan is not good, and once such a loan is extended,
the situation tends to worsen. A very large proportion of these troubled loans consequently
default, and the effect is compounded by the fact that loss recovery decreases for the loans
hence foreclosed. This effect is strong enough to create a significant drop in the overall
average of pool default frequency and default severity. In short, these loans reduce the
financial strength of the overall security and a large increase in spreads is required.
4.2.5.2 Extension Array #2
Due to the ad hoc nature of the extension probability assumptions, an alternate set of
assumptions was also analyzed. This second set of extension probability estimates are more
conservative than those of the initial array, and our expectations are therefore for reduced
extension effects under this second set of assumptions.
The magnitude of pricing differences encountered under the first extension set highlighted the
concern that the initial extension assumptions may have been unrealistic. A strong sensitivity
to these assumptions might be producing misleading pricing results, and it is possible that a
conservative set of assumptions might effect only minor pricing increases.
This is not the case. The pricing results obtained under the second set of extension probability
assumptions are also significantly different than those encountered under the case assuming
no extension risk. Table 4-Q compares the results from all three cases: i) No extension risk,
ii) Extension risk set #1, and iii) Extension risk set #2.
Table 4-Q
Extension Risk # 1 & # 2 Comparison- Spreads
DRAW- INDEPENDENT
LTV Term (yrs)
70% 3
WITH & WITHOUT Extension Risk #1 & Risk #2
Rate
8.00%
Amortization
1.0.
Volatility
17.5%
SPREAD (basis points)
-I t 10 0
186 158 94
235 196 124
211 161
473 383
92
273
U
109
1036
U U
80 33
846 523
U
50
1443
U
35
1220
U
8
671
18 15 6 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
169 145 78 155 125 56 27 22 4 7 3 0
221 193 117 445 369 225 708 588 327 815 650 356
18 15 6 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
143 119 63 51 52 10 3 0 0 0 0 0
216 174 112 314 296 151 379 314 170 377 303 174
Both sets of assumptions affect the required spreads. This generally holds true for all tranches,
across all structures and across all pool sizes, with the only exception being the already low
spreads (zero) of senior tranches for large sized pools. The second set of extension
assumptions do indeed produce lower results than those encountered under the first, but this
conservative second set of assumptions still indicates strong effects from exposure to
extension risk. Although the probability estimates do certainly play a factor in pricing, the
overall results would indicate that the pricing effects are not overly sensitive to the probability
estimate assumptions.
Finally, Table 4-R explains the spread differences in a manner similar to Table 4-P. Even
though this set of assumptions produces smaller levels of extension, we still encounter
increases in default frequency on the order of fifty percent. The loss recoveries are also
reduced in magnitude, and are only slightly smaller than those encountered under the initial
set of extension assumptions.
Table 4-R
Extension Risk # 1 & #2 Comparison- Default Incidence
DRAW. INDEPENDENT
LTV
70%
WTH & WTHOUT Extension
Term (yrs)
3
Rate
8.00%
Amortization
L. 0.
Risk #1 & Risk # 2
Volatility
17.5%
% Loans Extended
% Loans Defaulted
Recover(% of Avg Loan)
% Loans Extended
% Loans Defaulted
Recovery(% of Avg Loan)
% Loans Extended
% Loans Defaulted
Recovery(% of Avg Loan)
10.68% 6.82% 0.00%
8.28% 7.10% 4.56%
69.97% 70.72% 75.97%
10.38% 6.64% 0.00%
8.24% 7.06% 4.36%
71.09% 71.36% 76.27%
10.74% 6.36% 0.00%
8.46% 6.86% 4.50%
71.25% 71.08% 76.07%
10.82% 6.74% 0.00%
8.65% 6.99% 4.97%
69.64% 70.97% 76.20%
11.19% 6.65% 0.00%
8.66% 7.01% 4.58%
70.27% 70.21% 76.42%
10.76% 6.51%
7.87% 7.24%
70.51% 69.75%
0.00%
4.31%
76.58%
10.89% 6.31% 0.00%
8.46% 6.88% 4.47%
70.31% 71.20% 76.32%
10.73% 6.30% 0.00%
8.36% 7.01% 4.56%
70.54% 70.12% 77.05%
10.74% 6.58% 0.00%
8.50% 7.01% 4.46%
70.46% 70.27% 75.72%
10.77% 6.53% 0.00%
8.35% 7.09% 4.45%
70.06% 70.68% 76.22%
10.95% 6.70% 0.00%
8.56% 7.07% 4.61%
69.69% 70.67% 76.03%
10.90%
8.52%
70.57%
6.69% 0.00%
6.92% 4.58%
70.90% 75.84%
The effect of extension risk on default frequency is graphically illustrated by Figure 4-3.
The distinct increase in the percentage of loans that default as a result of either set of
extension assumptions may be clearly seen across all structures and pool sizes.
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5. Summary & Conclusion
The monte-carlo CMBS valuation model developed for this research appears to properly
account for numerous intricacies involved in pricing these securities. In addition, the analysis
has provided both supportive and original insight into the pricing uncertainties of CMBS by
appropriately factoring alternative marketplace parameters.
The pricing consequences from security design were examined under numerous scenarios, and
overall, predicted results fit characteristic behavior observed in the marketplace. The most
straightforward of these predictions calls for an increase in required spreads as tranche priority
decreases. This result is consistent with the expected effects from the reduction in credit
enhancement as one moves down the tranche priority ladder. Protection from default losses is
reduced with priority, and the model quantifies the pricing effects of such losses.
An extension of this same rationale dictates that spreads will decrease along with increased
size of subordinate tranches. The output does indeed reflect this increased level of protection
at all levels of the analysis. Furthermore, the spreads for the junior tranche also decrease as the
size of the junior tranche increases.
Further comparative static pricing effects were considered for varying security pool sizes (as
measured by the number of loans in the pool). These results consistently outlined inverse
relationships between spreads and pool size for both the senior and mezzanine tranches. This
result is consistent with the expected benefits from property diversification.
On the other hand, diversification was consistently shown to be detrimental to first loss
tranches. Increased cash flow volatility due to lack of diversification is beneficial to the junior
tranche since investors generally expect to be out of the money with respect to full return of
principal. Increased cash flow volatility increases the probability of no losses which lowers
the required yield spreads. Accordingly, the smaller the junior tranche, the greater the
detriment as a result of diversification.
Additionally, the model has indicated the possibility of an asymptotic limit for each of these
differing effects. That is, the inverse relationship between pool size and diversification
benefit, (or detriment in the case of the junior piece), holds only up to a certain pool size.
These limits are individually dependent upon tranche structure. For example, the smaller the
junior tranche size, the greater number of underlying loans required to reach its limit of
detrimental diversification, while the greater the credit enhancement for a superior tranche, the
fewer number of loans required to reach its limits of diversification benefit.
These divergent diversification effects were both confirmed by results obtained from pools of
non-correlated assets. A positive next step in the development of this model would provide for
the incorporation of a loan correlation matrix, and thereby provide the ability to quantify any
series of securitized loans, at any level of property price correlation.
Further testing allowed by the model included singling out the effects from changes in state
variable parameters and loan contract origination terms. Results here were entirely consistent
with prior whole loan research. In other words, for all remaining variable alterations the
results illustrated positive effects resulting from: i) decreased property price volatility, ii)
reduced initial loan to value ratios, iii) shorter terms to maturity, and iv) positive loan
amortization.
Finally, perhaps the most important results follow from the model's ability to isolate
extension risk. Under two distinct sets of assumptions regarding the likelihood of extension,
the model illustrated strong effects as a result of exposure to this risk. Furthermore, these
results occurred under an assumption of a flat term structure. In a scenario of an increasing
yield curve, the effects would have been even more dramatic. Results such as these might
indeed explain a portion of the excess spreads appearing in the market, and are important in
assessing the true risks of commercial mortgage backed securities.
Although the two sets of extension risk pricing results do not indicate extreme sensitivity to
the differing sets of assumptions, both sets are ad hoc in nature and further study is therefore
required in this area. Empirical research on extension frequencies would provide more reliable
parameter value estimates and therefore contribute valuable pricing insight.
Furthermore, although the model is able to effectively adjust for changes in the current term
structure of interest rates, it does not endogenize volatility in the term structure. Such an
improvement would further the understanding of extension and its effects, as timing issues
under changing spot rates would be incorporated.
An added benefit is that this approach would also allow the review of callable loans. There are
numerous contracts in which pre-payment of commercial loans is allowed, and the pricing of
securities comprised of such loans are likely to be effected.
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APPENDIX
"C" Source Code- CMBS Pricing Model
// PRICES **************** CMBS *
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
<conio.h>
<iostream.h>
<stdio.h>
<math.h>
<stdlib.h>
<time.h>
maino
{
clrscro;
// ***** VARIABLES *
char Extension;
int count, period, zone, n, loan, tranche, TotTranche;
int iteration, TotLoans;
float riskfreerate, DefFreq=0, Principal, TotPrincipal = 0, Extend = 0;
float NetEquity, Definterpolation, RandomDef, Interest, TotInterest = 0;
float SumLossRec=0, AvgLossRec, time, upperprob, lowerprob, ExtInterpolation;
float DefPerc, deltat, Normal, norm, sumnorm=0, LoanPercAvgRec, RandomExt;
float discrate=0, TotOLB = 0, InMaxMaturity =0, DefaultLoss = 0;
float Diff, EquilibRate, TempVal = 0, MaxMaturity;
double discfact;
//+++++Default Arrays+++++
float Boundry[] = {1.2, 1.1, 1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.4};
float EO[]= {0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.03, 0.07, 0.2, 0.4, 0.7, 1.0};
float ET[]= {0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.7, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0};
//+++++Extension Array+++++
float ExtBoundry[] = {1.1, 1.0, 0.8, 0.6};
float ExtProb[] = {0.1, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0};
//+++++Loan Arrays+++++
int PMTperPer[100], Ext[100] {0};
float OLB[100], LoanAmt[100], PMT[100], inmaturity[100], maturity[100], loanrate[100];
float payoutrate[100], propvol[100], LenderCost[100], InBldgVal[100];
double BldgVal[100];
//+++++Tranche Arrays+++++
float TranchePerc[10], IntDist[10], PrincDist[10], TrancheOLB[10];
float TrancheRate[10], TrancheVal[10]= {0}, SumTrancheVal[10]= {0};
float Spread[10];
float NonDefCashFlow[144][10] 0}0
randomizeo;
// ***** INPUTS*****
cout << "\nHow many loans are there ? ";
cin >> TotLoans;
/Loan parameter input
for (loan = 0; loan < TotLoans; loan++)
{ cout << "\nWhat is the Loan Amount for Loan #<" (loan+1) <<" ";
cin >> LoanAmt[loan];
cout << "\nWhat is the periodic payment for Loan #<" (loan+1) " ? ";
cin >> PMT[loan];
cout << "\nWhat is the term to maturity (years) for Loan # " <(loan+1) <<" ? ";
cin >> inmaturity[loan];
cout << "\nHow many payments per year are there for Loan # " <(loan+1) <<"
cin >> PMTperPer[loan];
cout << "\nWhat is the initial Building Value for Loan #<" (loan+1) <<" ";
cin >> InBldgVal[loan];
cout << "\nWhat is the annual loan rate (input as decimal i.e. 0.06) for Loan# " <(loan+1) <<" ";
cin <<loanrate[loan];
cout << "\nWhat is the building payout rate (decimal) for Loan # " <(loan+1) <<" ?";
cin >> payoutrate [loan];
cout << "\nWhat is the annual property volatility ? (decimal) for Loan # "<< (loan+l) <<" ? ";
cin >> propvol[loan];
cout << "\nWhat are the Lender's costs in event of foreclosure for Loan #" << (loan+1) <<" ?";
cin >> LenderCost[loan];
inmaturity[loan] *= PMTperPer[loan];
if (inmaturity[loan] > InMaxMaturity)
{ InMaxMaturity = inmaturity[loan];
}
TotOLB += LoanAmt[loan];
} /end of loan parameter input
cout << "\n\nlnclude extension risk ? (CAPITAL Y or N)";
cin >> Extension;
if (Extension == 'Y'){ cout << "\nExtension Risk is included";
}
else {cout << "\nExtension Risk is NOT included";}
cout << "\nHow many tranches are there excluding I/O tranche ?";
cin >> TotTranche;
cout << "\n****** NOTE: Tranches are numbered highest to lowest. i.e. Tranche 1 \n";
cout << " is the highest priority tranche and IO is the last tranche.\n";
//Tranche parameter input
for (tranche = 0; tranche < TotTranche; tranche++)
{ cout << "\nWhat percentage of the Total security consists of Tranche # " << (tranche+1) <<" ? ";
cin >> TranchePerc[tranche];
cout << "\nWhat is the contract rate of interest for Tranche #<" (tranche+1) << " ?";
cin >> TrancheRate[tranche];
}
cout << "\nThe 10 tranche will have no contract rate of interest\n";
cout <<" and will be 0 % of the total security";
/end of Tranche parameter input
cout << "\nWhat is the risk free rate ? ";
cin >> riskfreerate;
cout << "\n How many monte carlo simulations do you require? ";
cin >> iteration;
// * ITERATION LOOP *
for (count = 0; count <= iteration; count ++)
{ for (tranche = 0; tranche < TotTranche; tranche++)
{ TrancheVal[tranche] = 0;
TrancheOLB[tranche] = TranchePerc[tranche] * TotOLB;
}
TrancheVal[tranche] = 0; //to handle IO tranche
TrancheOLB[tranche]= 0;
MaxMaturity = InMaxMaturity;
for (loan = 0; loan < TotLoans; loan++)
{ OLB[loan] = LoanAmt[loan];
BldgVal[loan] = InBldgVal[loan];
maturity[loan] = inmaturity[loan];
Ext[loan] = 0;
}
// ********** PERIOD LOOP **********
for (period = 1; period <= MaxMaturity; period ++)
{ for (loan = 0; loan < TotLoans; loan++)
{ if (OLB [loan] <= 0)
{continue;
if (count > 0)
{ sumnorm =0;
deltat = 1.00000/12.00000;
for (n = 0; n < 12; n ++)
{ norm = random(1000 1);
norm /= 10000;
sumnorm += norm;
}
Normal = sumnorm-6;
// NORMALLY DISTRIBUTED
BldgVal[loan] = BldgVal[loan] + BldgVal[loan] * (riskfreerate - payoutrate[loan])
* deltat + BldgVal[loan] * propvol[loan] * Normal * sqrt(deltat);
NetEquity = BldgVal[loan]/OLB [loan];
// ********* DEFAULT TEST *
if (NetEquity <= Boundry[O])
{ for (zone = 1; zone < 9; zone ++)
{ if (NetEquity < Boundry[zone])
{ if (zone < 8)
{ continue;
}}
time = period/maturity[loan];
upperprob = EO[zone- 1 ]/PMTperPer[loan] * (1-(time*time))
+ ET[zone-1]/PMTperPer[loan] * time * time;
lowerprob = EO[zone]/PMTperPer[loan] * (1-(time* time))
+ ET[zone]/PMTperPer[loan] * time * time;
Deflnterpolation = (NetEquity - Boundry[zone])
* (upperprob - lowerprob)
/ (Boundry[zone-1] - Boundry[zone]) + lowerprob;
break; //break zone loop once have boundry
}
RandomDef = random(10001);
RandomDef /=10000;
if (RandomDef < Definterpolation) //DEFAULT
{ DefFreq += 1;
Interest = OLB[loan] * loanrate[loan]/PMTperPer[loan];
Principal = BldgVal[loan] - LenderCost[loan] - Interest;
DefaultLoss += (OLB[loan] - Principal); // To distribute loss after making tranche interest payment
OLB [loan]= 0; /Non-Recourse
TotInterest += Interest;
TotPrincipal += Principal;
SumLossRec += Principal;
continue;
/end of Default Test: if (N.E. < B[O])
/end of iteration 0 if
Interest = OLB[loan] * loanrate[loan]/PMTperPer[loan];
Principal = PMT[loan] - Interest;
OLB[loan] -= Principal;
TotInterest += Interest;
TotPrincipal += Principal;
//***** MATURITY & EXTENSION TEST *
if (period == maturity[loan])
{ if (count > 0)
{ if (Extension =='Y')
{ if (Ext[loan] == 0)
{ if (NetEquity <= ExtBoundry[O])
{ if (NetEquity < ExtBoundry[3])
{ ExtInterpolation = 1.0;
}
else { for (zone = 1; zone < 4; zone ++)
{ if (NetEquity < ExtBoundry[zone])
{ continue;
}
//Extension Test
upperprob = ExtProb[zone-1];
lowerprob = ExtProb[zone];
ExtInterpolation = (NetEquity - ExtBoundry[zone])
* (upperprob - lowerprob)
/ (ExtBoundry[zone-1] - ExtBoundry[zone]) + lowerprob;
break; //break zone loop once have boundry
RandomExt = random(1000 1);
RandomExt /=10000;
if (RandomExt < ExtInterpolation)
{ Extend += 1;
Ext[loan] = 1;
maturity[loan] += 24;
if (maturity[loan] > MaxMaturity)
{ MaxMaturity = maturity[loan];
//EXTEND
continue;
}
// End of Extend Test
TotPrincipal += OLB[loan];
OLB[loan]= 0;
I/ end of maturity check
/end of Loan Loop
// ********** TRANCHE LOOP *
discrate = 1 + riskfreerate/12.0000;
disefact = pow(discrate, period);
for (tranche = 0; tranche < TotTranche; tranche++)
{ IntDist[tranche] = TrancheOLB[tranche] * TrancheRate[tranche]/12.0000;
TotInterest -= IntDist[tranche];
if (TrancheOLB[tranche] > TotPrincipal)
{ PrincDist[tranche] = TotPrincipal;
}
else { PrincDist[tranche] = TrancheOLB[tranche];
}
TotPrincipal -= PrincDist[tranche];
TrancheOLB[tranche] -= PrincDist[tranche];
TrancheVal[tranche] += ((PrincDist[tranche] + IntDist[tranche])/discfact);
if (count == 0)
{ NonDefCashFlow[period][tranche] = PrincDist[tranche] + IntDist[tranche];
}
} /end of tranche distribution
if (count == 0)
{Totlnterest = 0;
TotPrincipal = 0;
}
/ ++++ IO Tranche ++++
IntDist[tranche] = TotInterest;
TotInterest -= IntDist[tranche];
TrancheVal[tranche] += IntDist[tranche]/discfact;
/ +++++ Distribute Default Losses +++++
for (tranche = TotTranche-1; tranche >=0; tranche--)
{ if (TrancheOLB[tranche] > DefaultLoss)
{ TrancheOLB[tranche] -= DefaultLoss;
break;
}
DefaultLoss -= TrancheOLB[tranche];
TrancheOLB[tranche] = 0;
00
DefaultLoss =0;
} /end of period loop
if (count > 0)
{ for (tranche = 0; tranche <= TotTranche; tranche++)
{ SumTrancheVal[tranche] += TrancheVal[tranche];
}}} //end of iteration ioop
// ********** FINAL NUMBERS *
for (tranche = 0; tranche < TotTranche; tranche++)
{ TrancheVal[tranche] = SumTrancheVal[tranche]/iteration;
}
fprintf(stdprn, "\n\n\n\n\n LTV= %f, LoanAmt= %f, Rate= %f, periods= %f, 100.00 * LoanAmt[O]/InBldgVal[0], LoanAmt[O],
loanrate[O], maturity[0]);
fprintf(stdpm, "\n PMT = %f, Volatility = %f\n", PMT[0], propvol[0]);
//+++++++ Spread Calculation +++++++
for (tranche = 0; tranche < TotTranche; tranche++)
{ EquilibRate = TrancheRate[tranche]/12.0000;
for (period = 1; period <= InMaxMaturity; period++)
{ disefact pow((l+EquilibRate),period);
TempVal += NonDefCashFlow[period][tranche]/disefact;
Diff= TempVal - TrancheVal[tranche];
if (fabs(Diff) < .005)
{ Spread[tranche] = 100.00 * (12.00 * 100.00 * EquilibRate -
TotOLB));
fprintf(stdpm, "\n\n
fprintf(stdprn, "\n
fprintf(stdpm, "\n
fprintf(stdpm, "\n
fprintf(stdprn, "\n
100.00 * TrancheRate[tranche]);
TRANCHE # %d (%f)", tranche+l, TranchePerc[tranche] * 100.00);
Value : $ %f', TrancheVal[tranche]);
Perc of orig Val: %f percent", TrancheVal[tranche] * 100.00 / (TranchePerc[tranche] *
Equilibrium Rate: %f percent", EquilibRate * 12.00 * 100.00);
Spread : %f basis points", Spread[tranche]);
PeriodLoop:
cout << "\nTRANCHE #<" (tranche+1) << ": (" << TranchePerc[tranche] * 100.00 << " % of Pool)";
cout << "\n Value : $" << TrancheVal[tranche];
cout << "\n % of Orig. Value: " << TrancheVal[tranche] * 100.00 / (TranchePerc[tranche] * TotOLB) <<" %";
cout << "\n Equilibrium Rate: " << EquilibRate * 12.00 * 100.00 <<" %";
cout << "\n Spread : "«Spread[tranche] << " basis points";
TempVal= 0;
continue;
}
if (Diff < 0)
{ EquilibRate -= .000001;
}
else { EquilibRate += .000001;
}
TempVal = 0;
goto PeriodLoop;
} // End of Spread Calculation
TrancheVal[tranche] = SumTrancheVal[tranche]/iteration;
cout << "\n\nIO TRANCHE value is: $" << TrancheVal[tranche];
fprintf(stdprn, "\n\n 10 Tranche Value is $ %f', TrancheVal[tranche]);
cout << "\n\nThere are " << TotLoans << " loans in this pool, and " << iteration <<" simulations were run.\n";
fprintf(stdpm, "\n\n There are %d loans in this pool, and %d simulations were run.\n", TotLoans, iteration);
cout << Extend << " loans extended, representing " << 100.00 * (Extend/(TotLoans * iteration)) <<" % of the simulations.";
fprintf(stdpm," %f loans extended, representing %f percent of the simulations.", Extend, 100.00 * (Extend/(TotLoans *
iteration)));
if (Extension != 'Y')
{cout << "\n(extension risk was not included)";
fprintf(stdprn, "\n (extension risk was not included)");
}
if (DefFreq > 0)
{ AvgLossRec = SumLossRec/DefFreq;
DefPerc = 100.00 * (DefFreq/(iteration * TotLoans));
LoanPercAvgRec = 100.00 * (AvgLossRec/(TotOLB/TotLoans));
cout << "\n\nThe number of loans that defaulted was: " << DefFreq;
fprintf(stdprn, "\n\n The number of loans that defaulted was: %f', DefFreq);
cout << "\nThe percentage of loans that defaulted was: " << DefPerc << "%;
fprintf(stdprn, "\n The percentage of loans that defaulted was: %f', DefPerc);
cout << "\nThe Average loss recovery as a percentage of the average loan is: " << LoanPercAvgRec <<" %";
fprintf(stdpm, "\n The Average Loss Recovery as a percentage of the Average Loan was: %f', LoanPercAvgRec);
}
else { cout << "\nNO Defaults Occurred";
fprintf(stdpm, "\n NO Defaults Occurred");
}
return 0;
